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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Olivia Schultz pleaded guilty to burglary and was sentenced to eight years, 
with two years fixed. While there was substantial information before the district court 
indicating that Ms. Schultz suffered from numerous mental health conditions, the district 
court failed to order a mental health evaluation prior to sentencing. The district court 
retained jurisdiction and eventually placed Ms. Schultz on probation. 
Thereafter, Ms. Schultz admitted to several allegations of probation violations. 
The district court placed her on a second period of retained jurisdiction, but 
subsequently relinquished jurisdiction and executed her original sentence of eight years, 
with two years fixed. Ms. Schultz timely appeals from her judgment of conviction and 
sentence. On appeal, she asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 
failed to sua sponfe order a psychological evaluation for purposes of sentencing 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 and I.C.R. 32. Ms. Schultz further asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over her case and executed 
her original sentence, 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Olivia Schultz entered a restaurant late one evening in Burley, Idaho. (R., p.12.) 
Ms. Schultz was crying and upset when she spoke to one of the employees of the 
restaurant, Angela Garcia, who was preparing to close the restaurant for the night. 
(R., p.12.) She told Ms. Garcia that she was trying to leave her husband, but that she 
had no money for fuel. (R., p.13.) Ms. Schultz then asked to use the phone, and 
Ms. Garcia directed Ms. Schultz to a phone in the restaurant. (R., p.13.) While 
Ms. Garcia went to take care of some other customers, she observed Ms. Schultz using 
the phone and then saw Ms. Schultz leave the restaurant. (R., p.13.) Ms. Schultz was 
apparently near the office where Ms. Garcia kept her purse while making the phone call. 
(R., p.13.) 
A short time later, Ms. Garcia went to get her purse so that she could retrieve her 
keys to lock up the restaurant for the night. (R., p.13.) It was then that Ms. Garcia 
noticed that her wallet was missing from her purse. (R. p.13.) Her wallet contained 
personal identification, $40, and credit cards. (R., p.13.) She immediately called and 
cancelled the credit cards in her wallet and notified police. (R., p.13.) A detective 
handling the case thought that Ms. Garcia's description matched Ms. Schultz. 
(R., p.13.) Upon being presented with a photographic line-up, Ms. Garcia identified Ms. 
Schultz as the person that she believed stole her wallet. (R., p.13.) 
Ms. Schultz was charged with grand theft of a financial transaction card and 
burglary. (R., pp.19-20.) At her arraignment, Ms. Schultz pleaded guilty to burglary. 
(319106 ~ r . ' ,  p.13, L.14 - p.17, L.18.) In exchange for her guilty plea, the State dropped 
the charge of grand theft of a financial transaction card and recommended an 
underlying sentence of eight years, with two years fixed. (319106 Tr., p.12, L.18 - p.13, 
L.13.) Additionally, the State recommended that the district court suspend Ms. Schultz's 
sentence and place her on probation. (319106 Tr., p.12, L.18 - p.13, L.13.) During the 
' Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings, citations to the 
transcripts of proceedings herein will be made according to the date upon which the 
proceedings occurred. 
plea colloquy, Ms. Schultz revealed that she had previously been hospitalized for issues 
related to several mental illnesses. (319106 Tr., p.15, L.17 - p.16, L.8.) 
The district court sentenced Ms, Schultz to eight years, with two years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (519106 Tr., p.17, Ls.1-5; R., p.39.) Twenty-one days 
later, while Ms. Schultz was still serving her period of retained jurisdiction, she filed an 
ldaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinaeer, Rule 35) motion seeking reduction of her sentence 
that was supported with an accompanying affidavit.' (R., pp.41, 46-48.) The district 
court denied this motion. (R., pp.49-57,) Thereafter, Ms. Schultz timely appealed from 
the district court's judgment of conviction and ~entence.~ (R., pp.59-60.) 
The district court held a rider review hearing prior to the expiration of its period of 
retained jurisdiction. (11/2/06 Tr., p.4, Ls.5-12.) After hearing the arguments of the 
parties, the district court suspended Ms. Schultz's sentence and placed her on 
probation for three years. (11/2/06 ~ r . ~ ,  p.15, Ls.18-25; Suspension of Sentence and 
Order of Probation, Augment. 5, Although Ms. Schultz was accepted into mental health 
- - 
' In light of the fact that Ms. Schultz's Rule 35 motion, and the affidavit filed in support of 
this motion, did not contain new and additional information, Ms. Schultz does not herein 
raise any issues on appeal with regard to the denial of this motion. See, e.g., State v. 
Huffman, 144 ldaho 201,159 P.3d 838 (2007). 
Ms. Schultz's Notice of Appeal was filed on July 21, 2006. (R., p.59.) However, 
because the district court retained jurisdiction in this case, Ms. Schultz's notice of 
appeal is timely from the original judgment of conviction because the time for filing her 
appeal was expanded by the district court retaining jurisdiction over Ms. Schultz's case. 
See I.A.R. 14; Appellant's Response to Conditional Dismissal, filed on August 14, 2006; 
Order Reinstating Appeal, entered on September 13,2006. 
The volume of transcripts of proceedings for the November 2, 2006 rider review 
hearing also contains the transcripts for the hearings held on April 26, 2007 and May 3, 
2007. 
For ease of reference, because the two supplemental clerk's records requested and 
ordered in this case were not bound or numbered when received from the district court 
clerk, citations to the materials provided in accordance with the orders for supplemental 
clerk's records will be made in accordance with the document title. 
court, she initially declined to participate in that program. (December 15, 2006 letter 
from Richard Neu, Mental Health Court Coordinator; Letter from Olivia Schultz to 
Mr. Neu; Augment.) 
Thereafter, the State filed a report of probation violations. (Report of Probation 
Violation, Augment.) The State alleged that Ms. Schultz had violated the terms and 
conditions of her probation by failing to pay costs and restitution, failing to check in with 
her probation officer for drug testing, being untruthful with her employer, allegedly 
selling prescription drugs to another person, changing residences without permission, 
getting fired from two jobs, and declining to participate in the mental health court 
program. (Report of Probation Violation, Augment, pp.1-5.) Ms. Schultz admitted to the 
State's allegations of probation violations. (513107 Tr., p.25, L.24 - p.26, L.1.) 
Based upon Ms. Schultz's representations that she wished to participate in 
mental health court, the district court delayed disposition on the allegations of probation 
violations. (513107 Tr., p.32, L . l l  - p.36, L.18.) Ultimately, Ms. Schultz did not meet the 
criteria for mental health court. (7119107 Tr., p.8, Ls.19-24.) The district court revoked 
Ms. Schultz's probation. (7119107 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-6.) However, in view of the pervasive 
mental health issues that Ms. Schultz was struggling with, the district court retained 
jurisdiction over her case a second time. (7119107 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-6; Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Probation Violation and Order of Commitment, 
Augment.) 
Prior to the expiration of the district court's period of retained jurisdiction, the 
court relinquished jurisdiction and imposed the original sentence of eight years, with two 
years fixed. (12/14107 Tr., p.16, Ls.9-16; Order on Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, 
Augment, p.3.) Ms. Schultz timely appeals from the district court's judgment of 
conviction and sentence. (R., pp.59-60.) 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to sua sponfe order a 
mental health evaluation for purposes of sentencing in this case? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua S~onfe Order A Mental 
Health Evaluation Pursuant To I.C.R. 32 And I.C. 6 19-2522 For Purposes Of 
Sentencing In This Case 
Under ldaho Criminal Rule 32(d), the district court may order a psychological 
evaluation of the defendant to be used in determining the defendant's sentence. The 
decision of whether to order a psychological evaluation is generally within the discretion 
of the district court. I.C.R. 32(d); Sfafe v. McFarland, 125 ldaho 786, 878-879, 876 P.2d 
158, 160-161 (Ct. App. 1994). However, the court may be required to order a 
psychological evaluation of the mental condition of the defendant if there is "reason to 
believe that the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at 
sentencing, and for good cause shown." I.C. 3 19-2522(1); McFarland, 125 ldaho at 
879, 876 P.2d at 161. A court may be required to sua sponte order a psychological 
report for sentencing if the failure to do so constitutes "manifest disregard for the 
provisions of I.C.R. 32," even if the defendant never requests such a report. State v. 
Craner, 137 ldaho 188, 191,45 P.3d 844,847 (Ct. App. 2002). 
In Idaho, the sentencing decisions of the district court are generally reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. State V. Burdett, 134 ldaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 
2000). The decision of whether to order a psychological evaluation is among those 
sentencing decisions that this Court reviews for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 
Sfate v. Hyde, 127 ldaho 140, 150, 898 P.2d 71, 81 (Ct. App. 1995). When a district 
court's discretionary determination is reviewed on appeal, this Court conducts a multi- 
tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue 
as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the bounds of its 
discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the district 
court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. See, e.g., State v. Rauch, 
144 ldaho 682, 685, 168 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 2007). The second inquiry is the 
primary issue for this Court's resolution in this case: whether, in light of the applicable 
legal standards governing when a psychological evaluation is mandatory for sentencing, 
the district court abused its discretion in this case. This Court exercises free review 
over whether the district court properly applied the applicable legal standards to the 
facts of a particular case. Stafe v. Eddins, 142 ldaho 423, 425, 128 P.3d 960, 962 
(Ct. App. 2006). 
There are several factors that may put the district court on notice that a 
psychological report is required under I.C.R. 32. Uncharacteristic or irrational behavior 
at the time the offense was committed is relevant to whether a psychological report is 
required. Craner, 137 ldaho at 191, 45 P.3d at 847. Whether the defendant's past 
criminal history included crimes of violence of a similar nature is also relevant. Id. In 
evaluating whether the district court was required to order a psychological report, this 
Court also may look to the information contained within, or omitted by, the presentence 
reports. Stafe V. Adams, 137 ldaho 275, 277, 47 P.3d 778, 780 (Ct. App. 2002). This 
Court may also consider the district court's comments regarding the mental health of the 
defendant in determining whether it was error for the district court not to sua sponte 
order a mental health evaluation. Craner, 137 ldaho at 191,45 P.3d at 847; McFarland, 
125 Idaho at 881, 876 P.2d at 163. 
The information contained within the Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI) demonstrated that Ms. Schultz suffered from numerous mental 
conditions, tracing back to her childhood, which operated jointly to impact her behavior 
and decision-making. (PSI, pp.16-31.) Specifically, there were three psychological 
evaluations conducted on Ms. Schultz from when she was 16 and 17 years old. (PSI, 
pp.16-31.) These evaluations attested to the severe traumas that Ms. Schultz received 
in her most probative years, and traced these traumas through to the behavioral issues 
and mental conditions that Ms. Schultz exhibited as a young adult. (PSI, pp.16-31.) 
These evaluations either diagnosed or found indications that Ms. Schultz 
suffered from depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, fetal alcohol syndrome, 
conduct disorders, and potentially multiple personality disorder. (PSI, pp.16-17, 21-22, 
27.) As a result of these conditions, Ms. Schultz struggled with a truncated general fund 
of knowledge, a lack of ability to make social judgments based upon past experiences, 
difficulty in concentrating, and a need to act out in negative ways in order to obtain any 
attention from the people around her. (PSI, pp.17-18, 20,26.) 
In addition, the presentence investigator's remarks also indicated the need for a 
mental health evaluation for purposes of sentencing. After summarizing the 
psychological evaluations conducted on Ms. Schultz as a teenager, the investigator 
opined that, "It would be to [Ms. Schultz's] benefit to follow through with Mr. Waite's 
recommendation to participate in individual therapy." (PSI, p.9.) The evaluator also 
recommended a substance abuse evaluation. (PSI, p.11.) 
The rationale behind the presentence investigator's recommendation that the 
district court place Ms. Schultz on a rider also demonstrates why a psychological 
evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 was necessary in this case. The investigator 
commented that the most important reason for the recommendation of retained 
jurisdiction was so that Ms. Schultz could be evaluated to determine, inter alia, what 
programs could best assess her mental health needs. (PSI, p . . )  The evaluator then 
went on to note that, upon completion of these evaluations and the rider program, "the 
Court will have additional information with which to make a more informed sentencing 
decision." (PSI, p.1 I.) 
Upon announcing that the court was retaining jurisdiction, the district court also 
noted that, while serving her rider, "they can address her substance abuse issues and 
assess her mental health needs there.'" (519106 Tr., p.16, Ls.20-22.) While the 
presentence investigator and the district court were correct in concluding that an 
evaluation of Ms. Schultz's mental health conditions would provide the court with the 
information necessary to make an informed sentencing decision, pertinent case law 
reveals that this evaluation must be completed before sentencing. As noted by the 
Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Coonfs: 
Nor does the availability of a mental health evaluation by the Department 
of Correction satisfy the statutory mandate. Section 19-2522 does not 
require a psychological evaluation merely to enlighten correctional officials 
who must make decisions on the defendant's conditions of confinement 
and treatment while incarcerated; the statute requires that the evaluation 
be conducted before sentencing so that the trial court will have the 
benefits of the evaluator's insights in fashioning an appropriate sentence. 
This Court may wish to note that this mental health evaluation appears to have never 
occurred while Ms. Schultz was on her rider. According to the addendum to the 
presentence report, as the evaluator made the recommendation that, "Ms. Schultz 
engage in a complete psychological evaluation," after the evaluator had reviewed the 
psychological materials contained in the presentence investigation report. (10/26/06 
APS, p.5.) However, a limited mental health evaluation was conducted during Ms. 
Schultz's second period of retained jurisdiction. (12/10/07 APSI, attached Mental 
Health Evaluation.) 
State V. Coonts, 137 ldaho 150, 153, 44 P.3d 1205, 1208 (Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis in 
the original). And ldaho Courts have specifically considered - and rejected - the 
propriety of waiting until a defendant is serving his or her rider before ordering a mental 
health evaluation. Stafe v. Banbuny, 145 ldaho 265, 269, 178 P.3d 630, 634 (Ct. App. 
2007). According to the mandates of I.C. !$ 19-2522, these evaluations must be ordered 
before sentencing itself in order to ensure that the purposes of the legislature in 
enacting this statute are fulfilled. Id. 
Moreover, the records of the proceedings, arguments of the parties, and 
statements from the district court all indicated an awareness of the centrality of 
Ms. Schultz's mental conditions to her culpability for her offense and to sentencing. At 
the change of plea hearing, Ms. Schultz made the district court aware that she suffered 
from numerous mental health conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder, that 
resulted from extensive abuse. (319106 Tr., p.15, L.17 - p.16, L.8.) 
At the sentencing hearing, both Ms. Schultz and the State made several 
comments about Ms. Schultz's mental health issues and how these should impact the 
district court's determination as to sentencing. (519106 Tr., p.6, Ls.2-16; p.9, L.12 - 
p.10, L.15.) Defense counsel specifically argued that Ms. Schultz's "mental state 
certainly played a role in her commission of this crime." (519106 Tr., p.9, L.12 - p.10, 
L.15.) And the district court acknowledged, while discussing the factors contributing to 
her sentence, that Ms. Schultz had mental health issues. (519106 Tr., p.15, Ls.15-17.) 
In contrast to the multiple indications that Ms. Schultz's mental conditions would 
be a significant factor at sentencing, the materials relied on by the trial court at 
sentencing did not otherwise provide the information required under I.C. $j 19-2522(3). 
This Court may uphold the district court's failure to order a psychological examination "if 
the information already before the court adequately meets the requirements of I.C. 3 19- 
2522(3)." Craner, 137 Idaho at 190, 45 P.3d at 846. The materials relied on by the 
district court did not meet the statutory criteria. 
Under I.C. $j 19-2522(3), the psychological report ordered by the district court 
must include the following information: ( I )  a description of the nature of the 
examination; (2) a diagnosis, evaluation, or prognosis of the mental condition of the 
defendant; (3) an analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect and level of 
functional impairment; (4) a consideration of whether treatment is available for the 
defendant's mental condition; (5) an analysis of the relative risks and benefits of 
treatment or non-treatment; and (6) a consideration of the risk of danger which the 
defendant may create for the public if at large. The record relied on by the district court 
did not adequately meet these requirements, and failed to even address several of the 
key elements of the statutory requirements. 
While there were several documents attached to the presentence investigation 
report that indicate pervasive and severe mental health conditions ultimately stemming 
from Ms. Schultz's abusive childhood, these assessments occurred in 1992 and 1993 - 
approximately 13 years prior to the offense at issue in this appeal. (PSI, pp.16-31.) 
Given the protracted length of time that had passed between her psychological 
evaluations and the district court's sentencing, the district court should have ordered a 
new mental health evaluation in order to determine the degree to which Ms. Schultz's 
documented mental conditions continued to impact her decisions and actions as an 
adult. 
Additionally, the psychological reports generated when Ms. Schultz was a 
teenage girl also do not address many of the considerations cogent to sentencing that 
are required pursuant to LC. § 19-2522. Of particular note, these reports did not 
provide the district court with any information regarding the relative risks and benefits of 
treatment versus non-treatment for Ms. Schultz as an adult, an analysis of the degree of 
the her mental illness or defect and level of functional impairment, nor did they address 
in any respect any consideration of the risk of danger which Ms. Schultz may create for 
the public if at large. 
Court-ordered psychological evaluations pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 can assist 
the sentencing court in assessing the defendant's capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his or her conduct and his or her general culpability for the underlying 
offense. State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 366, 195 P.3d 723, 725 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Given the central bearing that these reports may have in the fashioning of an 
appropriate underlying sentence in a case, the materials already before the district court 
on Ms. Schultz's mental health conditions did not adequately meet the requirements of 
I.C. 3 19-2522(3). As such, the district court abused its discretion, and acted in 
manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32, when it failed to sua sponfe order a mental health 
evaluation, conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, for purposes of sentencing in this 
case. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over 
Ms. Schultz's Case And Executed Her Oriqinal Sentence Of Eight Years. With Two 
Years Fixed 
In light of the substantial and compelling mitigating factors in Ms. Schultz's case, 
the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction, rather than place 
Ms. Schultz on a second period of probation, and when the district court failed to sua 
sponfe reduce her sentence pursuant to Rule 35 upon relinquishing jurisdiction. 
A. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over 
Ms. Schultz's Case. Rather Than Place Her On A Second Period Of Probation 
The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the district 
court to gain additional information about the defendant's rehabilitative potential and 
suitability for probation. See, e.g., Sfafe v. Lutes, 141 ldaho 911, 915, 120 P.3d 299, 
303 (Ct. App. 2005). In turn, the purpose of probation is to give the defendant an 
opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision. Sfafe v. Wakefield, 
145 ldaho 270, 273, 178 P.3d 635, 638 (Ct. App. 2007). A district court's decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Sfaffon, 
136 ldaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292 (2001). In this case, the district court abused its 
discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Ms. Schultz's case instead of placing her 
on probation. 
Ms. Schultz's earliest years were fraught with trauma, as prior to her fifth 
birthday, "she was the victim of constant physical and sexual abuse." (PSI I 1 This 
violent imprint made in her most formative years left Ms. Schultz with numerous mental 
conditions that started her on a path that led to a childhood of acting out, and that 
ultimate led to her conviction in this case. (PSI, pp.5-6, 11.) This included diagnoses 
for fetal alcohol syndrome, depressionldysthymic disorder, and conduct disorders in her 
teenage years. (PSI, pp.1 I, 22.') 
Prior to being adopted, Ms. Schultz suffered abuse and neglect at the hands of 
her mother until she was two or three years old. (PSI, p.20.) She was then shuffled 
from home to home for several years before finally finding a permanent adoptive family. 
(PSI, p.20.) According to past psychological examinations, as a direct result of the 
abuse visited upon her as a child, Ms. Schultz tends to act out negatively as a means of 
seeking the attention that she does not otherwise believe that she deserves. (PSI, 
p.18.) In addition to her struggles with mental illness, Ms. Schultz has also attempted to 
self-medicate w~th alcohol and drugs from a very young age. (PSI, pp.9-10.) 
While Ms. Schultz does have a prior criminal history, the offense at issue in this 
appeal appears to be her first and only felony. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Given her lack of a 
substantial criminal record, coupled with her long-term struggles with mental illness and 
substance abuse, there is every probability that, with appropriate treatment and 
oversight, Ms. Schultz will be able to further her own rehabilitation. 
When Ms. Schultz participated in her first rider, she worked very hard to 
complete all of the programming that she was assigned. (10126106 Addendum to the 
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafier, APSI), pp.1-2.) She also went beyond 
the assigned courses to obtain her food-handler's card, read 44 self-help books, 
attended church functions and numerous ANNA meetings, did 76 hours of volunteer 
The un-numbered pages of the presentence investigation report are referred to herein 
in accordance with consecutive hand-numbering of the pages, beginning at page 13. 
15 
work, and attempted to further her physical well-being by participating in yoga classes. 
(10/26/06 APSI, p.2.) Ms. Schultz's overall performance demonstrates that, given the 
appropriate level of oversight and personal dedication, she can be a successful and 
contributing member of her community. 
Under a review of the entire record in this case, the district court abused its 
discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Ms. Schultz's case rather than place her 
on a second period of probation 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua Sponte Reduce 
Ms. Schultz's Sentence Pursuant To Rule 35 Upon Relincluishincl Jurisdiction 
Over Her Case 
At the end of a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court may suspend the 
sentence and place the defendant on probation or may relinquish jurisdiction and 
execute the defendant's sentence. Lutes, 141 ldaho at 915, 120 P.3d at 303. If the 
court relinquishes jurisdiction, the district court may also reduce the defendant's 
sentence pursuant to Rule 35 at that time. Id. "It is common practice for a trial court to 
impose a rather severe underlying sentence as an incentive for the defendant to 
perform well in the retained jurisdiction program and to comply with probation terms if 
the defendant is ultimately placed on probation." State v. Jones, 141 ldaho 673, 676, 
115 P.3d 764, 767 (Ct. App. 2005). Given that the sentence originally pronounced by 
the district court may be artificially enlarged as a hedge against uncertainty, it is 
important to review the appropriateness of this sentence upon the court's determination 
to relinquish jurisdiction. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 ldaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 
(Ct. App. 1982). The ldaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within 
statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on 
the part of the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 ldaho 293, 294, 
939 P.2d 1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting Stafe v. Cotfon, 100 ldaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 
75 (1979)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: ( I )  
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id., 
quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 ldaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 ldaho 251, 253, 869 P.2d 568, 570 (Ct. App. 1994), citing State v. Forde, 113 ldaho 
21, 740 P.2d 63 (Ct. App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 ldaho 447, 680 P.2d 869 
(Ct. App. 1984). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are 
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was 
reasonable." Id., citing Lopez, 106 ldaho at 450, 680 P.2d at 872. 
Here, a review of the entire record in this case reveals that the district court 
abused its discretion when it failed to sua sponfe reduce Ms. Schultz's sentence upon 
relinquishing jurisdiction over her case. As noted above, Ms. Schultz's offense and her 
past behavior are largely attributable to severe mental health issues flowing from an 
abusive and unstable early childhood, Moreover, the offense at issue in this appeal was 
fairly de minimus: she stole only $40 and never caused or threatened any physical 
harm to anyone during the commission of her offense. See I.C. §§ 19-2521(a), (b). 
Given that Ms. Schultz does not have any history of prior felonies, and can likely lead a 
successful and law-abiding life given appropriate treatments for her substance 
addictions and mental health issues, the district court abused its discretion when it failed 
to sua sponte reduce her sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction over her case. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Schultz respectfully requests that this Court vacate her sentence and 
remand this case to district court for resentencing after a complete evaluation of her 
mental condition is made in compliance with I.C. § 19-2522. In the alternative, 
Ms. Schultz asks that this Court vacate the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction 
and remand this case for further proceedings. Alternatively, she requests that this Court 
reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2009. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of September, 2009, 1 served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
OLlVlA KAY SCHULTZ 
INMATE #81492 
SBWCC 
13200 S PLEASANT VALLEY ROAD 
KUNA ID 83634 
CASSIA COUNN PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
PO BOX 188 
BURLEY ID 83318 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
<A EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 

